2.2 Comparative Experience: Two models for core teams

Direct engagement by a team of elected officials (Moldova and Slovakia)

This first model was implemented by elected councilors and mayors from municipal governments in Moldova and Slovakia. In their respective cities, leaders formed teams responsible for designing, implementing and reporting on the feedback loop and personally participated in data collection engagement with residents.

In the cities of Vráble (pop. 8,323) and Šurany (pop. 9,238), Slovakia, implementation was spearheaded by the mayor – who serves as the head of the local council – and allied or politically affiliated local councilors. Unelected staff – employees of the city – played no role in the feedback loop process but, of course, played a role in implementing decisions. The deputy or vice mayor played a central role in managing and leading the process (acting as the decision-maker or process manager described in Section 2.3); local councilors assisted in data collection (handing out surveys door to door in a canvassing approach) and analysis. As these elected officials receive minimal remuneration (less than 100 Euros per month) in their positions, they continue to work in other professions and spent their personal time on door-to-door resident engagement (often after the workday or on weekends). Those with prior experience as civil society activists – common among the team in Vráble – cited this past volunteer experience as essential to their effectiveness. ⁴⁵

In Moldova, implementation has taken place across nearly 200 cities and typically centered on the mayor and their political team, which often included local councilors from the same political party or coalition; in some cases, local councilors in opposition led their own, parallel feedback loop processes. Mayors played a key role in these processes, serving both as the figureheads and driving force behind the door-to-door outreach and responses to public feedback. They also served as the primary, empowered decision-makers at the local level in the Moldovan legal framework.

In both the Slovakia and Moldova cases, local authority officials sought input from the public on key priorities and complaints by distributing brief printed surveys. These focused on public priorities around local infrastructure – such as roads, waste management, drinking water and public buildings like schools – to direct investment and funding in the local budgeting process in a way that was more responsive to resident priorities. The following chart presents lessons – in the form of advantages and risks – from these two experiences. See Annex IV for detailed timelines. 
 

The Moldova and Slovakia experiences provide many lessons that can guide decisions about whether this direct engagement approach is optimal for your community:

• This model may be selected out of necessity – the local administration may be very small. Elected officials may be unpaid or paid very little and lack a budget for support staff. In those instances, only the elected officials themselves can implement the feedback loop. They do not have to work alone, however, and can seek out volunteers or help from civil society.
• In both countries, feedback loops were conducted in small communities (10,000 or fewer residents) and relied on a door-to-door canvassing approach. Door-to-door canvassing requires a significant time commitment and is only feasible in small communities compared to large cities. Mayors and councilors from Slovakia reported that the process took much longer than they’d initially hoped or anticipated (see guidance in Step 4 about making this outreach more manageable and less time-consuming.)
• Teams should be prepared for the time commitment involved. Notably, in both Moldovan and Slovakian communities, officials with previous experience as volunteers and organizers accepted this extra work more readily. Often, door-to-door canvassing must be done outside working hours to reach community residents when they are at home. Moreover, in some local authorities, elected officials serve part time and maintain other jobs, which must be factored into scheduling.
• When local elected officials lead the process, especially if there is a face-to-face element to soliciting feedback and updating the public, there is a benefit to public trust. As noted in Section 1, mayors implementing these processes enjoyed higher rates of re-election (80 to 90 percent) over the last three election cycles compared to incumbents across the country (50 to 60 percent). Since voters worldwide complain that they only hear from politicians during election campaigns, a feedback loop can be a meaningful way to keep the conversation going and sustain voter interest and engagement.
• If the feedback loop is implemented by a team from the same coalition or political party, opposing groups may seek to undermine the process or cast doubt on its results. This risk can be mitigated by opening participation in the design and implementation of the feedback loop to all local officials from across parties.
• Finally, consider the morale and mental health of teams and officials implementing the process amid criticism – ensure that they have the support and assistance of their team and colleagues. Officials without adequate support may find the process overwhelming and disheartening at times, especially if feedback is not forthcoming. ⁴⁷

Supervisory engagement – A team of public sector staff and civil society (Mexico and El Salvador)

The second model was implemented in Mexico and El Salvador, where mayors and local elected officials were aware of and supported the feedback loop effort, but the bulk of the work was completed by staff from planning departments. These municipalities tended to have larger populations or more rural and difficult-to-reach communities. In addition, the focus of the feedback loop process was more targeted to specific stakeholders (especially civil society) and often reached fewer residents than in Moldova and Slovakia, which were focused on feedback from the whole community.

In examples from two different cities in Mexico, staff from the municipal planning agencies of Guanajuato (pop. 194,500) and Tamazula de Gordiano (pop. 39,000) gathered feedback from civil society and residents through public meetings and forums to identify public needs, propose solutions and inform priorities for forthcoming municipal development plans. Guanajuato City officials created a first draft of the municipal development plan – a broad strategy that covers many issues, including the economy, transit and security – and, over the course of a month, collected feedback through the municipal website and social media, during a handful of public meetings around the city, and hosting a social forum or town hall, using a World Café format.⁴⁸ Approximately 60 residents provided feedback on specific questions or issues within the draft plan. Government officials produced a second draft plan, incorporating public feedback, and requested additional input via social media. To close the feedback loop, municipal officials held a public hearing to present the updated Municipal Government Program to civil society, citizens and public servants; 32 people attended the hearing. In Tamazula, local officials reached fewer residents, conducting a similar World Café-style public meeting with 20 people and using this feedback to develop their plan.

In El Salvador, officials and civil society in the municipalities of Ilobasco (pop. 77,800), Guacotecti (pop. 7,600) and San Isidro (pop. 8,100)⁴⁹ collected feedback on how to improve economic development, working closely with Community Development Associations (Asociación de Desarrollo Comunal; ADESCO) in each municipality to identify participants and topics. Municipal authorities in El Salvador are required by law to create five-year participatory strategic plans, though there are no set guidelines for completing the process. As such, rather than be directly involved with the design and implementation, mayors instead oversaw the process and were “customers” of the process results. The staff and ADESCOs led the process, in which stakeholders completed online surveys to provide their priorities. Priorities were combined with an extensive diagnostic – or detailed report – of the current economic, social and planning trends in the municipalities to inform a series of recommendations transmitted to the mayor and political leadership. See Annex IV for detailed timelines.

The following chart presents lessons – in the form of advantages and risks – from these experiences.

Several lessons have been identified in the course of this more administrative approach to feedback loops undertaken in Mexico and El Salvador, as a supervisory engagement model:

• This model is especially useful when the local authority in question has a very large or geographically dispersed population. Door-to-door canvassing by individual officials, especially the mayor, is not feasible in medium-sized or large cities; these officials face large demands on their time, resulting from the increased complexity of their communities and sheer number of constituents. In addition, these local authorities often have larger administrations with more technical staff that have the training, technology and other resources to achieve broad and inclusive public input. Therefore, leaders in these local authorities can work with their administrations to adapt the feedback loop framework to focus on specific governance processes and documents, collect feedback from a more targeted group of residents and do so over a shorter period.
• Mayors and elected officials can be more involved in these processes by being present at meetings and events where feedback is collected, which can increase the credibility of the process and create accountability to follow up on feedback. For example, a public commitment from the mayor to respond to feedback (such as through a public report) can lend credibility to feedback loop processes and encourage public participation. Note that when it comes to specialized consultations or dedicated working groups, civil society and academia sometimes prefer to interact with technical and administrative staff and decision-makers (rather than elected officials).
• By leveraging the skills, time and resources of the public administration, the feedback loop process can be accomplished more quickly than when relying on elected officials alone. This is especially true if the core team is empowered to implement the process and coordinate effectively with colleagues (to plan, share information and ensure the local authorities more quickly respond to feedback).
• As elected officials are less directly involved (not conducting face-to-face meetings and door-to-door canvassing), the model will not necessarily boost public trust (and voter confidence) in those individual officials. However, trust in the local authority and the municipal departments leading outreach and responding to feedback should increase. This is supported by OECD research that indicates responsiveness of civil service and local government increases public confidence.⁵⁰